CRISPR-Y Kreme - I'll have mine with extra sprinkles

“Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether they could, they didn't stop to think if they should.”

Ian Malcolm - Jurassic Park

Recent advances in genetic engineering have revealed potentialities to cure, and perhaps even eradicate, diseases that have historically proven unconquerable. Of particular promise is the CRISPR-Cas9 gene-sequence editing technology, which offers myriad possibilities for altering the genetic make-up of individuals both post and preconception. Within those possibilities, however, exist opportunities to radically “redesign” human beings, enhancing characteristics considered valuable and attractive while removing those considered not. The American philosopher John Rawls posited that society’s distributive shares were improperly decided by an arbitrary “natural lottery” lacking moral foundation, a world where an accident of birth determines people’s fortunes. Unfortunately, John Rawls died before CRISPR-Cas9 developed sufficiently to pose this question directly, but would he have supported its use as a means of eliminating this “natural lottery” and equalising life’s starting point? The following discussion will argue that the use of CRISPR-Cas9 to genetically “design” humans is not morally permissible. Examining the issue through a Rawlsian lens, this essay will consider notions of diversity and homogeneity, demonstrating that while CRISPR-Cas9 offers compelling medical reasons for limited use, its genetic design capabilities are incompatible with Rawls' “veil of ignorance”.

Does CRISPR-Cas9 eliminate the need for a “veil of ignorance” when conceiving principles of justice? In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls describes his vision of an “original position of equality” which he calls the “veil of ignorance”. Behind this imagined veil, we have no knowledge of ourselves, those around us, or our society. We are challenged, from this position, to determine what individual rights we should hold and the principles that will govern our society. Rawls hypothesizes that in this context, people will ultimately choose principles of justice that are innately fair. CRISPR-Cas9, it could be argued, offers the possibility of such a “position of equality”. One in which children start life with equal “natural” attributes, with the same potential for success or failure. In this society, it might be assumed there would be no need for a “veil”.

This argument, however, holds flaws. For instance, we can assume that parents alone will own responsibility for the decision about whether to use this technology on their children. If it was possible to endow every child born with the same physiological characteristics, would all parents choose for their children the same attributes? Stephen Hsu, co-founder of Genomic Prediction, an advanced genetic testing company, addresses this question in the documentary Human Nature. Hsu observes, that when discussing his company’s technology, he is often asked by tall blonde people “aren't you worried that all parents will want to make tall blonde babies? “Geeks”, he says, ask “aren’t you concerned that all parents will want to make super smart babies?”(Bolt 2019). His point is simple; different people like different things. If, given a choice, parents are predisposed to select different attributes, aligned with their individual preferences, it seems more likely society will continue to comprise great diversity, rather than edging toward homogeneity. In this context, an individual’s natural talents and abilities remain diverse, offering varied opportunities, and Rawls’ “veil” would continue to prove critical to ensuring the conception of just principles.

The counter to this argument would contend that while society holds diverse preferences, its “aversions” are more uniform. By using CRISPR-Cas9 to remove those characteristics that are universally detested, incrementally the population edges closer to homogeneity. It starts with chronic diseases, then disabilities, Albinism next, then obesity, then short people, and so on. Where is the line drawn? These

are valid concerns and pose ethical questions unrelated to Rawls’ theory of justice, that nonetheless add to the uncertainty of how, or if, this technology should be used.

Diversity and the risk it poses are fundamental to Rawls’ theory of justice. From behind the “veil”, while we are unaware of our position in society, we know that on the other side, in the real world, people will be different. Some will be rich, and some will be poor, some smart and others not, attractive and unattractive, and so on. It is the element of the unknown, the risk that we might be one of the “less-fortunate”, that compels us to choose just principles. What decisions, then, would we make about our principles from an original position of equality absent that risk, in a world levelled out by CRISPR-Cas9? Knowing we had the intelligence, strength, and beauty to succeed regardless of circumstance, would we favour principles that redistributed our wealth to benefit the least advantaged in society? Rawls is sceptical of our ability to make fair and just decisions from a position of awareness of ourselves, noting that people will favour different principles reflecting their social position and interests (Rawls 2009). Rawls’ scepticism has proven valid as inequality of income and wealth, between both individuals and nations, continues to rise throughout the world. Those that have an advantage, material or otherwise, seem to prefer policies, if not principles, that protect or enhance their advantages (Partington 2019). Those with less advantage and opportunity pursue policies that will help to improve their position. If use of CRISPR-Cas9 became widespread, and diversity decreased, as people gain predictable insight into theirs and their children’s future prospects, it stands to reason they would continue to choose those principles that favoured their particular circumstances, rather than those that were inherently just.

This debate remains hypothetical as we have yet to achieve the technological advances necessary to realise some of the outcomes discussed in this paper. This issue is incredibly complex and likely to evolve into one requiring concrete policies. The question: What is wrong with altering future generations to make “better versions of ourselves”? - is a valid one. To “design” a human, or a race of humans, however, is not a morally justifiable use for this technology. In doing so, we face the threat of eliminating the intrinsic diversity that is critical to a dynamic society and eschews the responsibility to make moral decisions about how we should govern it.

REFERENCES AND CITATIONS:

• Bolt, Adam. 2019. Human Nature. Streaming. USA: Netflix. https://wondercollaborative.org/human-nature-documentary-film/.

• Partington, Richard. 2019. “Inequality: Is It Rising, and Can We Reverse It?” The Guardian, September 9, 2019. http://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/sep/09/inequality-is-it-rising-and-can-we-reverse-it.

• Rawls, John. 2009. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.

• Various. 2007. Justice: A Reader. Edited by Michael J. Sandel. Oxford University Press.